Should We Be Eliminativists (mereological nihilists)?

Introduction

Simples, or a “simple”, is a term used to denote the smallest possible building block of reality that there is. Our current scientific understanding is that these are quarks and electrons, but in striving to be more accurate, the term ‘simples’ is used. Eliminativism is the view that no everyday objects exist in reality - all that exist are the simples that are arranged in different ways and appear to us as those everyday objects, such as a chair or table. Reductionism is the view that objects do exist in reality, but they are identical to the sum of their parts, i.e., the sum of the simples that make the objects up. Non reductionism is the view that objects are things in their own right, “over and above” (Steward, 2023, p.18) the sum of their parts. Pluralism, in this context, is a view that includes different sets of beliefs in regards to different kinds of objects: for example, being an eliminativist about everyday objects, but a non-reductionist about biological creatures with psychological properties. In this essay I will be arguing for the pluralist view of holding eliminativist beliefs about everyday objects, but non-reductionist beliefs about all biological entities; that we should be eliminativists about tables and chairs but not about beetles.

Part 1 - biological entities have unique properties

I will start by looking at the definition of non-reductionism: it states objects exist in their own right and are separate from the sum of their simples, meaning that for an object to be non-reducible, it must have properties that cannot be explained by the properties of the sum of the object’s simples, as inferred by the thesis proposed by Merricks (2001, Chapter 1, Section I). To be able to categorise something as non-reducible we must ask, what kinds of properties can’t be explained in terms of the properties of the object’s simples? Physics nowadays tells us that the simples of an object make up its atoms, which in turn are bound together to form the object. For an everyday object, such as a chair, we can easily see that all there is to it is the material from which it is made - the simples that make it up. It has no special causal powers that are not predictable from the causal powers of its parts, that is to say, any influence the chair may have on its surroundings is predictable from the influence its parts have on each other and their surroundings. This is true because we know the physics of the chair; we know what the properties of its simples are, and can use these to explain the properties of the chair as a whole.

Now take some ‘thing’ that isn’t an everyday object - a biological creature like a beetle for instance. Because the beetle is a thing made of matter, it is also made of simples, just like the chair is. However, the causal powers of a beetle are not entirely predictable from the causal powers of its parts: while the properties of simples may be able to explain something arbitrary like mass for instance, they do not seem to be able to explain all the properties that a beetle may have. The beetle can scurry, it can fly; and while this can be explained in terms of its biology and psychological properties, as Dupre concisely explains, these cannot be reduced to physics (Dupre, 2007). Biological entities have properties that are unique to something that is classed as “alive”, and everyday objects, while made of the same fundamental particles, do not possess these properties. Because these biological entities cannot be reduced to explanations based purely on their fundamental particles (or simples), the properties of their parts cannot explain the properties of the entity as a whole, which is why I am of the opinion that any biological entity, whether an animal or a plant, and including beetles, should be viewed as a non-reducible entity and should not be eliminated.

Part 2 - disregarding reductionism

An advocate for reductionism may argue that it mediates between both non-reductionism and eliminativism; that by stating both that there are objects and that they are just the sum of their simples, it is a view which could be said to include the ‘best of both worlds’ (Steward, 2023, p.2). Nevertheless, once the core concept of reductionism is understood, it is easy to begin to poke holes in this ontological belief. The reductionist says that everyday objects exist, but that they are nothing more than the sum of their parts - that is, that the object is exactly equal to the sum of its parts. Baker’s argument against reductionism, which uses Leibniz’s Law, first states that an object must have all the same properties as the sum of its particles, and then argues that while the object has the property of being able to lose some particles and still survive as the same object, if the sum of particles loses some particles it will no longer be the same sum of particles (Baker, 2007, p.27). This concludes in stating that the object is not equal to the sum of its particles. Another way of looking at this is that if the object were to lose a couple of atoms, it would no longer be the same object, and therefore what most people may view as one object is really a series of different objects constantly replacing each other, which defies all credibility. Because of this major flaw in reductionism, I am going to disregard this view as not sufficiently backed up by logic or reason, and certainly without any real utility.

Part 3 - establishing eliminativism for everyday objects

With the disregarding of reductionism and the establishing of how non-reductionism can only accurately be argued for biological entities, this leaves eliminativism. I will, nonetheless, argue for the advantages of eliminativism in regards to everyday objects, and not solely adopt the eliminativist view due to the elimination of the other views/due to it being the only one left. One such advantage of adopting this position on everyday objects is that it leaves no sorites paradox to be explained away: because there is no object to begin with, the question of how much can be removed from the object until it is no longer the same object, is no longer relevant. This is a major advantage because it solves a very important issue that arises when discussing the persistence conditions or survival of an object for those ontologies in which objects do exist, and which do not have a satisfactory answer for when an object ceases to be the same object it was previously upon procedural removal of its simples.

Someone who is an eliminativist about all things, including biological entities, may argue that this sorites paradox also applies to biological entities, such as for example, how many parts of a beetle can be lost before the beetle ceases to be the same entity? They may also give you the same problem of persistence conditions but in reverse, and argue that because the beetle has grown from a small egg to an adult beetle, it is not the same beetle as before. This latter argument can be refuted with the statement that it is part of the nature of biological entities to grow and change, and even though it is made up of different particles now, it is in its initial coding for this to happen and so it is the same entity that it always was. Furthermore, in regards to the former argument, the sorites paradox works on everyday objects because any one of the simples that make up the object possesses the properties that the object as a whole possesses, and so removing a simple, or any number of simples, takes away from the properties that ‘constitute’ the object. In contrast, building from the steps which Merricks outlines and then expands upon in Objects and Persons (2001, Ch.4-5) in which he argues that for humans, their parts don’t cause their mental life; using a similar line of reasoning and grounded in the argument that biology cannot be reduced to physics, it follows that for biological entities, their parts don’t causally produce their properties, and so removing any parts from a biological entity does not remove the properties that make them that entity; so removing some of their parts does not cause them to cease to exist as that entity.

However, as Unger states, the sorites paradox is not strong enough to eliminate “physical objects” altogether, but rather only “everyday things” (Unger, 1979, p.121), meaning that if any part is removed from an everyday thing and there is something left then the remaining parts could still conceivably be an object. So, a further argument must be established to eliminate all objects. This argument is one which uses parity of reasoning, which states that when comparing two or more different arguments or claims about the same thing, the same reasoning and structure must be applied to both arguments. In this case, it is used when imagining a body of water; we don’t view a body of water as one whole object, or as Merricks puts it, “a big wet chunky thing that fits snugly in the pool” (2001, Chapter 2, Section I), but rather as lots of tiny individual parts which have all been put into the pool and appear to us as a large ‘group’ of water. The argument states that the kind of reasoning that we apply to water that leads us to see it not as a single object but as a visible collection of water molecules, should be transferable to all things we view as ‘objects’ - it forces us to ask what is so special about a chair or a table that they should be viewed as whole objects, compared to water. This puts pressure on the non-reductionists to accept a form of eliminativism, as this argument is very plausible and even intuitive, especially because the initial premise is likely accepted by “folk ontology” (Merricks, 2001, Chapter 2, Section I) - the non-reductionist view. If the water is a quantitative thing, something that is only viewed as billions of water molecules placed together, then why is the chair not treated the same?

Conclusion

To conclude, there are many logical arguments against the usually accepted ‘common-sense’ view of the world, such as the previously explored parity of reasoning argument and the many variations of the sorites paradox, and with our current science it is my belief that this common ontology that declares everyday things as objects is an inconsistent and unsound viewpoint. Due to the arguments listed in this essay, I believe that the only logical conclusion for which ‘objects’ really exist is that everyday objects such as tables and chairs do not exist, and should be eliminated, while any biological entity such as a beetle, is non-reducible and should not be eliminated.

References

Steward, H. 2023. The Metaphysics of Everyday Objects. PHIL1090 Knowledge, Self and Reality. 27 April, University of Leeds.

Merricks, T. 2001. Objects and persons. [Online]. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. [Accessed 4 June 2023]. Available from: https://academic.oup.com/book/9701 [no pagination]

Thomasson, A.L. 2007. Ordinary objects. [Online]. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. [Accessed 4 June 2023]. Available from: https://academic.oup.com/book/11675 [no pagination]

Dupre, J. 2007. Is biology reducible to the laws of physics? American Scientist. 95(3), p.276.

Steward, H. 2023. Reductionism, Nonreductionism and Pluralism. PHIL1090 Knowledge, Self and Reality. 28 April, University of Leeds.

Baker, L.R. 2007. The metaphysics of everyday life: an essay in practical realism. [Online]. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Accessed 4 June 2023]. Available from: https://www.vlebooks.com/Product/Index/356902?page=0&startBookmarkId=-1

Unger, P. 1979. There are no ordinary things. Synthese. 41(2), pp.117-154.